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THE FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT:
SET ASIDE THE MORAL AND ETHICAL DEBATES,
HOW DOES ONE OPERATE WITHIN THIS LAW?
Kevin J. Smith*

I.

INTRODUCTION

The recent Fdd6ration de Internationale de Football Association
("FIFA") bribery scandal has brought the United States' attention back
to ethics in business, and how overseas companies and entities ethically
operate.' In addition, the FIFA bribery scandal has brought to the
world's attention that the United States acts differently when it gets its
way versus when it does not.2 Some have argued that the United
States' efforts in going after FIFA officials were initiated by the
fact that American bribes were not accepted and Russia got the
World Cup instead.3
Countries around the world deal with bribery in different areas of
business as does the United States, but how much we want to look at

* J.D., University of South Dakota School of Law, 1996; B.S., Montana State UniversityBillings, 1992; M.S.A.S., University of South Dakota, 2000. I have worked in a variety of legal
settings within the private sector, including the last seventeen years working for an international
trading company. I would like to thank Brandon Holst, a research specialist, for his assistance with
this Article. Mr. Holst earned a M.S.L.S. from Clarion University of Pennsylvania in 2014 and a
B.A. from Brigham Young University in 2010.
1. For an excellent breakdown of the scandal and the events leading up to it, see
Austin Knoblauch & Barry Stavro, A Timeline on the FIFA Scandal, L.A. TIMES (June 2, 2015,
4:40 PM), http://www.latimes.com/sports/soccer/la-sp-fifa-scandal-timeline-20150603-story.html.
For additional information, see Laura Wagner, Mob Museum Unveils FIFA Corruption Exhibit,
NPR (Sept. 1, 2015, 5:44 PM), http://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-way/2015/09/01/436670649/mob-museum-unveils-fifa-corruption-exhibit (disclosing the addition to the Las Vegas Mob
Museum).
2. See, e.g., Anna Arutunyan, FIFA Corruption: Vladimir Putin Accuses U.S. of Meddling,
USA TODAY (May 28, 2015, 6:02 PM), http://www.usatoday.com/story/sports/soccer/2015/05/28/
putin-russia-fifa/28058777.
3. See, e.g., Mark Porubcansky, Why the FIFA Investigation Had to Be Conducted by US.
Officials, MINNPOsT (May 28, 2015), https://www.minnpost.com/foreign-concept/2015/05/whyfifa-investigation-had-be-conducted-us-officials.
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bribery in these cases can make many feel uncomfortable.4 This is
because we all want to win and compete for the prize, whatever that
prize may be, and that leads to questionable ethical behavior. As we
have seen with the International Olympic Committee and FIFA, bribery
is a world issue.'
Questions of ethical practices become cloudy because of the
complexities of competition in international business and politics. In
1977, Congress passed the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act ("FCPA") to
attempt to curb the unethical behavior of American businesses doing
business overseas.' Since then, the U.S. Department of Justice ("DOJ")
and U.S. Securities & Exchange Commission ("SEC") have governed
adherence to the law by American businesses. Over time, the agencies
have become more strident in their enforcement of the law and thus have
defined its parameters.7 Nonetheless, the World Bank estimates that
more than one trillion dollars in bribes occur every year, and yes, that is
"t" as in trillion.' That is about 3% of the world's economy.9
However, the U.S. government continues to pursue its goal. Since
the DOJ and SEC issued their latest Resource Guide for the FCPA in
November 2012,"o there has been much written about the morals and
4. See, e.g., Leonid Bershidsky, Stop Bribery by Legalizing It, BLOOMBERG (Aug. 31, 2015,
10:58 AM), https://www.bloomberg.com/view/articles/2015-08-31/stop-bribery-by-legalizing-it
(discussing Romania's discussion on whether to legalize bribery of doctors); Aaron Bornstien, On
the Ground in Cambodia: Was My Antibribery Fight Just Dust in the Wind?, FCPA BLOG (Aug. 31,
2015, 9:18 AM), http://www.fcpablog.com/blog/2015/8/31/on-the-ground-in-cambodia-was-myantibribery-fight-just-dust.html (discussing rampant bribery in Cambodia); Richard Partington, UK.
Looks to Relax Money Laundering Rules to Help Businesses, BLOOMBERG (Aug. 28, 2015, 7:15

AM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-08-28/u-k-looks-to-relax-money-launderingrules-to-help-businesses (discussing the United Kingdom's efforts to assist businesses in moneylaundering controls).
5. For a breakdown of corruption around the world, see CorruptionPerceptionsIndex 2014:
Results, TRANSPARENCY INT'L, https://www.transparency.org/cpi2014/results (last visited Aug. 1,

2017).
6. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-213, 91 Stat. 1494 (codified in
relevant part as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-1 to -3 (2012)).
7. See infra Part ll.B.
8. Matthew Stephenson, Where Does the "$1 Trillion in Annual Bribes" Number Come
From?, GLOBAL ANTICORRUPTION BLOG (Apr. 22, 2014), https://globalanticorruptionblog.com/

see also Eric H.
2014/04/22/where-does-the-1-trillion-in-annual-bribes-number-come-from/;
Holder, Jr., Att'y Gen., U.S. Dep't of Justice., Remarks at the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (May 31, 2010), https://www.justice.gov/opa/speech/attomey-generalholder-delivers-remarks-organisation-economic-co operation-and (referencing the same one trillion
number in bribes in 2010).
9. Nathaniel B. Edmonds & Daniel Darsky, Advanced Anti-Corruption/Bribery Program
&

Practice: Challenges, Trends, and Effectively Managing Risk, Soc'Y OF CORP. COMPLIANCE

ETHICS (Oct. 7, 2013), http://www.corporatecompliance.org/Portals/1/PDF/Resources/past
handouts/CEI/2013/101_AdvancedAntiCorruptionBriberyProgramPractice_2slides.pdf
10.

U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE & U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM'N, A RESOURCE GUIDE TO THE U.S.
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ethics of bribery and how the FCPA can be used to eradicate it." Many
American authors are stating how the world should work and how much
better the economies of the world would work without bribery. 2 They
may all be right; however, these are American perspectives-cast upon
another country's morals, ethics, and culture. This is a dangerous way of
thinking even if it is the proper attitude. Placing our values of right and
wrong on another country and culture is a reason why many countries
and their business people are cautious of Americans."
The purpose of this Article is not to state, advocate, or cast any
value judgments on the provisions of the FCPA. Neither is it to take any
moral or ethical stance, but to provide a roadmap for those who want to
become acquainted with the FCPA and how the United States
government has enforced it. The problem is that every region of the
globe presents different issues and sometimes the separate countries
within that region present different issues. This is why the FCPA is
sometimes vague-it has to be. To restrict the provisions within the
FCPA would be to restrict the ability to conduct international business.
The U.S. government is well equipped to define and administer the
FCPA. As with any law, as more cases are decided, the law becomes
more defined. As a result, one can look into the U.S. government's
enforcement of the FCPA and begin to assemble a guide to the FCPA.
This Article focuses on the Anti-Bribery Provisions of the FCPA
and cases that the SEC and DOJ have been involved with over the past
two years. The question is who the FCPA's Anti-Bribery Provisions
cover, and what exactly is a bribe? The answer is framed as follows:
In general, the FCPA prohibits offering to pay, paying, promising to
pay, or authorizing the payment of money or anything of value to a
foreign official in order to influence any act or decision of the foreign
official in his or her official capacity or to secure any other improper
advantage in order to obtain or retain business.14

FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT (2012), http://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/criminalfraud/legacy/2015/01/16/guide.pdf [hereinafter RESOURCE GUIDE].
11. See, e.g., Elizabeth K. Spahn, Implementing Global Anti-Bribery Norms: From the
Foreign Corrupt Practices Act to the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention to the U.N. Convention
Against Corruption, 23 IND. INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 1, 3-5 (2013); Amy Deen Westbrook,
Enthusiastic Enforcement, Informal Legislation: The Unruly Expansion of the Foreign Corrupt
PracticesAct, 45 GA. L. REv. 489, 560-62, 566-71 (2011).

12. See, e.g., Spahn, supra note 11, at 4.
13. For an example comparing two cultures, see Dennis A. Pitta et al., Ethical Issues
Across Cultures: Managing the Differing Perspectives of China and the USA, 16 J. CONSUMER
MARKETING 240 (1999).
14. RESOURCE GUIDE, supra note 10, at 10, 106 n.44 (citing several cases in which the U.S.
government used this phrasing for jury instructions).
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BACKGROUND

When the FCPA was enacted in 1977,"5 it was the result of the
SEC's investigations into more than 400 U.S. companies, including 20%
of Fortune 500 companies.16 These companies had made illegal, or at
least questionable, payments to foreign government officials, politicians,
and political parties." These payments ranged from what would later be
referred to as "grease" payments to ensure that government officials
performed their mandatory duties (issuance of business licenses, for
example), to outright bribery of high-ranking foreign officials to secure
favorable action by a foreign government, and totaled over $300
million." Congress reacted to the SEC's investigation by enacting the
FCPA to "bring a halt to the bribery of foreign officials" and "to restore
public confidence in the integrity of the [international] American
business system." 19
In 1998, the FCPA was amended by the International Anti-Bribery
and Fair Competition Act,20 and again in response to the Organization of
Economic Cooperation and Development ("OECD") Convention on
Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business
Transactions, which was signed in 1997.21 This effort with the OECD
began in 1988 when the U.S. government began working to get other
countries, which were major U.S. trading partners, to enact similar
legislation.22 By the time the 1998 OECD Amendment was enacted,
thirty-three countries had signed the OECD agreement.23 These
amendments expanded the FCPA to cover any person-not just issuers
or domestic concerns.24
One can argue that this effort by the U.S. government was to
prevent the loss of business that American companies would face if only
15. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-213, 91 Stat. 1494 (codified in
relevant part as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-1 to -3 (2012)).
16.
17.

RESOURCE GUIDE, supra note 10, at 3.
Pedro Fabiano, Panel on Domestic/InternationalInitiatives, 3 SANTA CLARA J. INT'L L.

247, 247 (2005). The payments totaled over $300 million, and that was in 1970-dollars and not
adjusted to any current values. Id.

18. Id.
19. Id.
20. International Anti-Bribery and Fair Competition Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-366, 122
Stat. 3302 (1998) (codified in relevant part as amended in 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-1 to -3 (2012)).
21. United States v. Kay, 200 F. Supp. 2d 681, 686 (S.D. Tex. 2002). For the full OECD
provision, see OECD, CONVENTION ON COMBATING BRIBERY OF FOREIGN PUBLIC OFFICIALS
IN INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS TRANSACTIONS 6-14 (2011), http://www.oecd.org/daf/anti-bribery/

ConvCombatBriberyENG.pdf.
22. Fabiano, supranote 17, at 248.
23. Id.
24. Id. at 249.
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the U.S. passed such legislation. If only U.S. companies had to abide by
such legislation, they would operate at a competitive disadvantage. Thus,
obtaining the cooperation of these thirty-three countries was critical to
the survival of the FCPA.
Armed with the cooperation of thirty-three countries, the 1998
Amendments reflected Congress's will to reach conduct outside the
U.S., in spite of the presumption against legislative extraterritoriality. 25
Now, any American citizen or entity in violation of the FCPA is
subject to prosecution under a broad jurisdictional scope, as are their
foreign agents. 26
However, foreign officials who receive bribes are not covered by
the FCPA, nor can they be prosecuted for conspiracy to violate it.2 7 This
is very important for the practitioner to understand because the foreign
official has nothing to risk by implying a bribe, or assuming one will be
given. Thus, the foreign organization may be operating under fewer
restrictions, and thus may or may not be sympathetic to its partner's
situation. As international business develops, many more countries are
beginning to enact laws similar to the FCPA.28 In addition, the FCPA
has been translated into many different languages so that businesses in
other countries can study the limits of the law as well.29
III.

WHO IS PAYING?

Even with the 1998 Amendments to the FCPA, it is still good to
understand the basic question of who is a payer under the law.30 Upon
reading the FCPA, one must define who is paying, or providing the
money, gift, or other item of value. Under the FCPA the one who is
paying the money is called (1) an issuer,31 (2) a domestic concern, 32 or
(3) a certain other person or entity.33 In civil enforcement, issuers fall
25. See H. Lowell Brown, ExtraterritorialJurisdiction Under the 1998 Amendments to the
Foreign Corrupt PracticesAct: Does the Government's Reach Now Exceed Its Grasp?, 26 N.C. J.

INT'L & COM. REG. 239, 288-97, 303 (2001) (discussing all of the changes the law made).
26. Id. at 296-97.
27. United States v. Castle, 925 F.2d 831, 831 (5th Cir. 1991).
28. Joseph Warin et al., The British Are Coming!: Britain Changes Its Law on Foreign
Bribery and Joins the InternationalFight Against Corruption, 46 TEX. INT'L L.J. 1, 4-8, 14-19

(2010).
29.

Alert: FCPA Translatedinto 14 Languages, SQUIRE PATTON BOGGS: ANTICORRUPTION

BLOG (Dec. 15, 2010), http://www.anticorruptionblog.comi/foreign-corrupt-practices-act/alert-fcpatranslated-into-14-languages.
30. See Sonila Themeli, FCPA Enforcement and the Need for Judicial Intervention, 56 S.

TEx. L. REv. 387, 391-92 (2014) (breaking down the definition with the FCPA).
31. 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-l(a) (2012).
32. Id. § 78dd-2(a).
33. Id. § 78dd-3(a).
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under the authority of the SEC, while domestic concerns and other
entities fall under the authority of the DOJ.34 The DOJ has exclusive
35
authority to enforce the criminal aspects of the FCPA in all situations.
Thus, determining where the company or entity falls within this legal
definition could involve different federal agencies. Since the concerns
addressed in this Article fall under possible criminal sanctions and civil
sanctions, both agencies will be discussed.
A.

Issuers

The first category of covered persons mentioned in the FCPA are
the issuers.3 6 Essentially any company that has securities registered
under section 12 of the Exchange Act37 or files required reports with the
SEC3 8 will be considered an issuer.39 As a result, foreign companies will
also be considered issuers if they list depositary receipts on any U.S.
exchange. 4 0 As seen from the cases discussed below, this language has
given the U.S. government the ability to pursue foreign companies and
their transactions, both civilly and criminally, even if those transactions
never touched U.S. soil. Lastly, included within this definition is that
any officer, employee, or agent working on behalf of the company,
foreign or domestic, is considered an issuer and thus subject to
prosecution under the FCPA. 4 ' Agents working on behalf of the
company seem to be a familiar description of the ones that get
companies into trouble with the FCPA. This will be discussed in more
detail later in the Article.42
B. Domestic Concerns and Other Entities
A place to begin to define a domestic concern is the case Chevron
Corp. v. Donziger.43 A domestic concern is "any individual who is a
citizen, national, or resident of the United States" and "any corporation,
partnership, association, joint-stock company, business trust,
34. Nollner v. Southern Baptist Convention, Inc., 852 F. Supp. 2d 986, 996 (M.D. Tenn.
2012).
35. Id
36. See Themeli, supra note 30, at 391 (citing 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-1(a)).
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. Id; see also S.E.C. v. Straub, 921 F. Supp. 2d. 244, 250 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (stating that the
defendant company's securities were traded through American depositary receipts listed on the New
York Stock Exchange, therefore the defendant was considered an issuer under the law).
40. Straub, 921 F. Supp. 2d at 250.
41. Themeli, supranote 30, at 291.
42. See infra notes 109-10 and accompanying text.
43. 974 F. Supp. 2d 362 (S.D.N.Y. 2014).
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unincorporated organization, or sole proprietorship which has its
principal place of business in the United States."" In Chevron Corp., the
defendant was a U.S. citizen and an attorney with membership in the
New York State Bar.4 5 The defendant's office was also in the United
States.46 As a result, establishing the defendant as a domestic concern
under the FCPA was rather easy for the court to conclude.47
Establishing a violation of the FCPA was just about as easy.48
Under the FCPA, "a domestic concern must 'make use of the mails or
any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce' in furtherance of
the payments." 49 In this case, the defendant's use of the Internet for
e-mails in furtherance of the bribery scheme was sufficient to satisfy the
interstate commerce requirement of the FCPA.so The court also stated
that his transfer of funds was sufficient to satisfy the requirement." The
court concluded that the defendant's acts were corrupt and intended to
influence official action.52 What made this an easy case for the court was
the fact the defendant went by a code name and used a secret account.
Lastly, the court concluded the payments made were of value.5 4 The
FCPA prohibits corrupt payments of money and other items of value. 5
This has been construed broadly to include many different things that
could be of value to the person being bribed. 6 Thus, the statute prohibits
cash bribes and also other nonconventional quid pro quo transactions.
44. 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-2(h)(1)(A-(B) (2012); see also Lamb v. Phillip Morris, Inc., 915 F.2d
1024, 1027-28 (6th Cir. 1990) (stating that agents of domestic concerns are included as issuers).
45. Chevron Corp., 974 F. Supp. 2d at 596.
46. Id.
47. See id.
48. See id. at 596-99.
49. Id. at 596 (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-2(a) (2012)).
50. Id. at 596-97. The facts of the bribery scheme in this case were so complex the court
referred to them as "things that normally come only out of Hollywood." Id. at 384; see also S.E.C.
v. Straub, 921 F. Supp. 2d. 244, 262-64 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (discussing how e-mail is sufficient to
establish the use of interstate commerce under the FCPA bribery requirements).
51. See Chevron Corp., 974 F. Supp. 2d at 596 (citing Compl. at 9, 17-19, United States v.
Brown, No. 4:06-cr-00316 (S.D. Tex. Sept. 11, 2006)) (alleging that a transfer of funds to a bank
account for use as improper payments for PetroEcuador officials satisfied the interstate commerce
element).

52. Id. at 597.
53. See id.
54. Id.
55. Id. (citing 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-2(a) (2012)).
56. See, e.g., United States v. Liebo, 923 F.2d 1308, 1310-11 (8th Cir. 1991) (finding that
paying foreign officials' travel expenses to obtain or retain business constitues a violation under the
bribery provisions of the FCPA); Rotec Indus., Inc. v. Mitsubishi Corp., 163 F. Supp. 2d 1268,
1278-79 (D. Or. 2001) (stating that an offer of employment is considered "giving something of
value"); Schering-Plough Corp., Exchange Act Release No. 49838, 82 S.E.C. Docket
3644 (June 9, 2004), https://www.sec.gov/litigation/admin/34-49838.htm (finding that charitable
contributions also qualify as something of value).
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THE THREE QUESTIONS

The real issues for practitioners and companies come down to three
questions. The first question is, "Is it illegal in a given foreign country to
receive this form of payment?" The second is, "Did the payment
influence an act or decision?" This is the most complicated of the
questions and this Article spends the most time addressing this issue.
The last question is, "What is the amount or the value of the payment in
question?" These are the grey areas that many of us in international
business concern ourselves with, but the focus of the concern is on
question number two. These questions, however, are the areas in which
those who deal in a black-and-white world may struggle with. If a
practitioner or company understands these three questions and asks them
every time a payment is made, they should be in a position to stay easily
within the law and be able to protect themselves if there are questions
about the transaction.
Thus, to understand the FCPA is to understand these three
questions. The statutory vagueness embedded in the word "value," and
how it must influence an act or decision is further explained in the FCPA
as follows:
It shall be an affirmative defense to actions under subsection (a) or (g)
of this section that-(1) the payment, gift, offer, or promise of
anything of value that was made, was lawful under the written laws
and regulations of the foreign official's, political party's, party
official's, or candidate's country; or (2) the payment, gift, offer, or
promise of anything of value that was made, was a reasonable and
bona fide expenditure, such as travel and lodging expenses, incurred
by or on behalf of a foreign official, party, party official, or
candidate and was directly related to-(A) the promotion,
demonstration, or explanation of products or services; or (B) the
execution or performance of a contract with a foreign government or
agency thereof.57
As one can see, there are some permissible situations where gifts
and payments are legal, provided that they fit under these exceptions.
However, the three questions remain. The first question is: "Are the
payments legal in the foreign official's country?""

57. 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-1(c) (2012).
58. See, e.g., S.E.C. v. Jackson, 908 F. Supp. 2d 834, 849, 858 (S.D. Tex. 2012) (stating that
the SEC showed enough evidence to establish that the defendants violated Nigerian law); United
States v. Lockheed Corp., No. CRIM.A.1:94-CR226MHS, 1995 WL 17064093, at *1, *5 (N.D. Ga.
Jan. 3, 1995) (stating the fact that under Egyptian law, it would be illegal for an Egyptian official to
accept payments from a U.S. corporation that influences his acts and decisions).

http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlr/vol45/iss4/9
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Is It Legal in that Foreign Country?

If the law of the foreign country does allow for this type of payment
to occur, then the company would be protected under the FCPA as long
as the other two questions are addressed and answered in the same
manner. However, this is a good place to start. If the company is making
payments that are illegal in the foreign country, those payments need to
be prevented-period.
Thus, the payments must be legal in that foreign country where the
payment took place and technicalities cannot provide protection. For
example, in United States v. Kozeny,59 the court stated that while the
defendant was relieved of criminal responsibility in the foreign country
based upon a technicality, it did not excuse him from the violation of the
FCPA in the United States.60 The court stated a company could not be
guilty of violating the FCPA if the payment made by the company was
legal in that country.61 However, there is no defense under the FCPA if
the company cannot be prosecuted in a foreign country based on a
technicality or its being excused from the criminal behavior. 62
If the payments violate the foreign country's law, there is no
defense afforded under the FCPA. It follows that a defendant may assert
that a payment was lawful under the laws of the foreign country in
which the payment was made. However, as anti-corruption legislation
has spread throughout the world, this defense is not often available.
Furthermore, many American businesses have been entangled by the
ambiguity or conflicts in the laws of other nations, quite common in the
developing world.63 Determining whether a payment was lawful under
the written laws of the foreign country may be difficult or problematic at
best. Extreme caution is suggested if the only available recourse would
be using this defense to avoid prosecution under the FCPA.
B.

Didthe Payment Influence an Act or Decision?

The next question to address is: "What kind of payment was it?"
The FCPA does contain an exception to the anti-bribery provisions for
facilitating payments for routine governmental actions, otherwise known

59.
60.
61.
62.

582 F. Supp. 2d 535 (S.D.N.Y. 2008).
Id. at 539.
Id.
Id.

63. For a site that addresses the conflict of laws in an international setting, see CONFLICT OF
LAWS .NET, www.conflictoflaws.net (last visited Aug. 1, 2017) (containing current issues and stories
in international law conflicts).
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as grease payments, gifts, or tips.' Congress intended to include a
defense for payments made in facilitation of non-discretionary acts of
mid or lower-level officials.65 When Congress enacted the FCPA, the
House of Representatives noted language in the law that would allow
facilitating payments, or grease payments.66
Those not exposed to the FCPA may not believe that Congress
explicitly used the term "grease payments" in defining federal law in the
context that such payments are legal, but that is the phrase Congress
used.67 The FCPA expressly permits "facilitating" or "grease payments"
to foreign officials to "expedite or to secure the performance of routine
governmental action[s]" 68 as long as the payments are not used to
encourage a foreign official "to award new business or to continue
business with a particular party."69 Even with that distinction, there are
grey areas that can cause companies to make mistakes.
The language of the FCPA intends to distinguish between payments
that cause foreign officials to act contrary to, or not in conformity with,
their normal pattern in making a decision-or committing an illegal act
within their country-as opposed to those payments that are limited to
non-discretionary decisions.7 Congress also included a similar note
stating the law does not cover the aforementioned "grease payments"
and included a list of acceptable payments to foreign officials such as
expediting shipments through customs, placing a transatlantic telephone
call, securing required permits, obtaining adequate police protection, and
other transactions which may involve the proper performance of the
64.

15 U.S.C. § 78dd-2(b) (2012).

65. See, e.g., Matt A. Vega, The Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the Culture of Bribery: Expanding
the Scope of Private Whistleblower Suits to Overseas Employees, 46 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 425, 436,

444-45 (2009) (discussing the differences between levels of officials).
66. H.R. REP. No. 95-640, at 4 (1977); see also United States v. Kay, 359 F.3d 738, 750-51
(5th Cir. 2004). Congress has carefully limited this exception. See id at 750 ("We agree with the
position of the government that these 1988 amendments illustrate an intention by Congress to
identify very limited exceptions to the kinds of bribes to which the FCPA does not apply. A brief
review of the types of routine governmental actions enumerated by Congress shows how limited
Congress wanted to make the grease exceptions.").
67. Id.
68. §§ 78dd-1(b), -2(b), -3(b); see also United States v. Giffen, 326 F. Supp. 2d 497, 501
(S.D.N.Y. 2004) (citing § 78dd-2(b)). The Senate Committee on Banking, Housing and Urban
Affairs wrote the statute does not "cover so-called 'grease payments' such as payments for
expediting shipments through customs or placing a transatlantic telephone call, securing required
permits, or obtaining adequate police protection, transactions which may involve even the proper
performance of duties." S. REP. NO. 95-114, at 10 (1977).
69. §§ 78dd-1(f)(3)(B), -2(h)(4)(B), -3(f)(4)(B); see also Arthur F. Matthews, Defending SEC
and DOJ FCPA Investigations and Conducting Related Corporate Internal Investigations: The
Triton Energy/Indonesia SEC Consent Decree Settlements, 18 Nw. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 303, 316

(1998) (arguing that money intended to expedite undisputed debt is a facilitating payment).
70. See §§ 78dd-l(f)(3)(B), -2(h)(4)(B), -3(f)(4)(B).
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foreign officials' original duties. 7 ' Even with this clarification, grey
areas exist. For example, the author has had experiences with customs in
various countries where it has been common to provide payments to
local custom agents to expedite shipments through customs, to have
them essentially do their job. It would become illegal if that payment
was made to ensure the shipment's ability to pass through customs-if
the shipment would not have passed Customs without the payment.
Although the 1988 amendments to the FCPA added the exception
for "facilitating payments," Congress was sure to explain that the
amendment was only to clarify ambiguities, not to change the original
intent of the law.72 Thus, the legislative history of the FCPA is clear in
its intent to provide an exception for certain types of payments if they
are considered facilitating.73 The facilitating payment exception is
limited to allow for bribes to mid- or low-level foreign officials to
expedite or secure the performance of a routine government action.74
That is correct-a payment that most Americans would consider a bribe
is not considered a bribe or illegal payment under those circumstances.
However, the courts have determined that while the FCPA includes
obtaining permits as an exception to the bribery definition, it is limited
to those permits that the company is already properly entitled to obtain
from that official.7 1
Congress was trying to accomplish the prohibition of bribes that
would induce foreign officials to misuse their authority and bribes that
would disrupt economic efficiency and foreign relations of the United
States.76 However, protecting the "payments," to expedite minor
ministerial actions, is to be kept outside the scope of the FCPA antibribery provisions. Congress has stated:
While payments made to assure or to speed the proper performance of
a foreign official's duties may be reprehensible in the United States,
the committee recognizes that they are not necessarily so viewed
elsewhere in the world and that it is not feasible for the United States
to attempt unilaterally to eradicate all such payments.78

71. S. REP. No. 95-114, at l0.
72. See Kay, 359 F.3d at 750 (citing S. REP. No. 100-85, at 54 (1987) and H.R. REP. No. 10040, pt. 2, at 76-77 (1987)).
73. Kay, 359 F.3d at 750.
74. § 78dd-l(b); Kay, 359 F.3d at 750-51.
75. S.E.C. v. Jackson, 908 F. Supp. 2d 834, 857-58 (S.D. Tex. 2012) (citing H.R. REP. No.
95-640, at 8 (1977)).
76. Lamb v. Phillip Morris, Inc., 915 F.2d 1024, 1028-29 (6th Cir. 1990).
77. See H.R. REP. No. 95-640, at 8 (1977).
7 8. Id
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Routine governmental actions are non-discretionary actions that a
foreign official ordinarily performs in his daily business.7 9 This is the
provision that causes so many ethical concerns in the U.S. and for many
American businesses. It is difficult for many people and businesses in
the U.S. to understand the nature of this provision and accept the reality
of the situation.
This is where understanding and accommodating the culture of the
foreign nation that the company is doing business in, and complying
with its customs becomes important. There is no need to have to agree
with the necessity of providing grease payments or bribing in this
situation, but understand also that the other country is not the United
States, and does not necessarily want to be. In my experience, many
Americans have a really hard time with that concept. Bribery has been
the business norm in many countries for decades or centuries,so and
forcing U.S. values into their system can be insulting and may deter
future business; Congress recognized this. Simply put, if a U.S.
company does not agree on how business takes place in a foreign
country, then it should not do business there.
The facilitating payments exception, however, never applies when a
foreign official has discretion to award or continue business with a
party."1 As more U.S. businesses are conducting business in foreign
markets in all corners of the globe-especially in developing countries
(and those with a history of bribery as a part of doing business)-they
need to know what is acceptable in the foreign country may still amount
to a violation of the FCPA.
Nevertheless, those payments meant to encourage the performance
of a routine governmental action by an official, political party, or
candidate are exempt.82 The FCPA provides some examples of routine
governmental actions, such as obtaining official documents to qualify a
person to do business in a foreign country or processing governmental
papers, including visas and work orders.83 Routine governmental actions
also include: providing police protection, transporting mail, scheduling
79. See §§ 78dd-1(f)(3)(A), -2(h)(4)(A), -3(f)(4)(A); see also H.R. REP. No. 100-85, at 53-54
(1987) (describing the FCPA's routine governmental action exception). Examples include obtaining
permits, licenses, or documents needed to do business in a foreign country; processing
governmental papers, such as visas and work orders; scheduling inspections; providing police
protection; mail pick-up or delivery; phone, power, and water service; and loading, unloading, or
protecting perishable products or commodities. See §§ 78dd-l(f)(3)(A), -2(h)(4)(A), -3(f)(4)(A).
80. Spahn, supra note 11, at 1-6.
81. See Emily N. Strauss, "Easing Out" the FCPA FacilitatingPayment Exception, 93 B.U.
L. REv. 235, 241-42 (2013) (discussing the facilitating payment exception in detail).
82. Id. at 241.
83. §§ 78dd-l(f)(3)(A), -2(h)(4)(A), -3(f)(4)(A).
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inspections associated with contract performance, inspections related to
transit of goods across the country, providing phone service, power and
water supply, loading and unloading cargo or protecting products from
deterioration, and actions of a similar nature.84
However, routine governmental actions do not include influencing
a decision by an official to award business or to continue to do business
between the company and the foreign government." Because the
distinction between a permissible facilitating payment and an improper
bribe can be difficult to discern even amongst those experienced in
international business, it is always important to consult with an attorney,
compliance professional, or person in charge of internal protocols prior
to making any payment for the first time.
Anyone who has worked in a country where corruption is
commonplace knows how difficult it can be to get things done while
avoiding payments completely. In fact, it cannot be avoided in some
circumstances.86 Thus, as a necessary result, the FCPA contains an
exception to its anti-bribery provision for payments made to facilitate or
expedite performance of a routine governmental action. Under the
exception, making a payment to a government official to do something
he or she should have been doing anyway is permissible.87 The author
found this extremely common in the former Soviet Union after its
collapse in 1990. In many of the former republics, the governments
were trying to figure out how to operate under a post-Soviet
communistic government.
In addition, within the FCPA, making a payment to a government
official to expedite something that must be processed is permissible."
The first example is providing that government official with a payment
to do what her job already entails, while the second example is a
payment to get the government official to speed up. However, if during
the processing a government official is paid to move an application or
request in front of others, then the actor is essentially paying to change
the outcome of the situation. This result this goes against both the
written language and the intent of the FCPA. Nonetheless, one can see
how grey the line can be between operating within the law and outside
the law.
84. §§ 78dd-l(f)(3)(A), -2(h)(4)(A), -3(f)(4)(A).
85. See United States v. Kay, 359 F.3d 738, 750-51, 755-56 (5th Cir. 2004).
86. See, e.g., Baghdasaryan v. Holder, 592 F.3d 1018, 1020-25 (9th Cir. 2010) (discussing
widespread corruption in Armenia); United States v. Kozeny, 582 F. Supp. 2d 535, 536-37
(S.D.N.Y. 2008) (explaining defendant's argument that corrupt conditions exist regarding payments

to encourage privatization in Azerbaijan).
87. See §§ 78dd-2(b), (h)(4)(A).
88. See §§ 78dd-2(b), (h)(4)(A).
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What Is the Amount?

This defense is only available if the business can show: (1) the bona
fide expenditure lacks a corrupt purpose; and (2) the amount is not
excessive. 8 9 However, the expenditure must be either directly related to
"the promotion, demonstration, or explanation of products and services"
or to "the execution or performance of a contract with a foreign
government or agency." 9 0 Limited travel expenses, for example, would
likely be permissible under the FCPA, while unnecessary and lavish
expenditures almost certainly violate it. Similarly, travel expense
reimbursements for an official to evaluate a product would likely be
permissible, but travel expense reimbursements for his accompanying
family would not. 91
The DOJ Opinion Procedure Releases help to define the parameters
of this defense because case law has not fully defined it as of yet. 92
Although the courts will continue to rule, the DOJ has released opinions
indicating that expenditures are more likely to be considered reasonable
and bona fide if two conditions are met: (1) payments are made directly
to the service provider like a travel agency, as opposed to the
government official; and (2) the company making the payments does not
have pending business with the government agency whose employees
are receiving the benefits of the expenditures. 93 The burden of
establishing whether a payment meets these requirements rests with the
defendant because this is an affirmative defense.94
89. See Elizabeth S. Shingler, Note, The Foreign Corrupt PracticesAct: A New Approach to
the Reasonable and Bona Fide Expenditure Defense, 7 BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L. 537, 545-

46 (2013) (discussing the bona fide expenditure defense).
90. §§ 78dd-l(c)(2)(A)-(B), -2(c)(2)(A)-(B), -3(c)(2)(A)-B).
91. See §§ 78dd-l(c)(2), -2(c)(2), -3(c)(2).
92. See U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT REVIEW, OPINION
PROCEDURE RELEASE No. 07-01 (July 24, 2007), http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/

opinion/2007/0701.pdf (stating the requesting company's willingness to pay for a six-member
foreign official delegation visit to view a U.S. domestic operations site fits within the terms of the
"promotional expenses" affirmative defense of §§ 78dd-l(c)(2)(A), -2(c)(2)(A)); U.S. DEP'T OF
JUSTICE, FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT REVIEW, OPINION PROCEDURE RELEASE No. 04-03

(June 14, 2004), http://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/criminal-fraud/legacy/2010/04/11/0403.
pdf (stating the DOJ does not intend to take action against a company for sponsoring foreign
officials on a trip to the U.S. to meet with public-sector officials on the regulation of employment
issues).
93. See supra note 91 and accompanying text; see also Thomas R. Fox, Not Draconian- Gift
Travel and Entertainment Under the FCPA, FCPA COMPLIANCE & ETHICS (July 19, 2013),
http://fcpacompliancereport.com/2013/07/not-draconian-gift-travel-and-entertainment-under-the-

fcpa (discussing DOJ Opinion Releases approving companies' expenditures).
94.

Kyle P. Sheahen, I'm Not Going to Disneyland: Illusory Affirmative Defenses Under the

Foreign Corrupt PracticesAct, 28 WIS. INT'L L.J. 464, 469, 478 (discussing the burdens of proof
for the affirmative defenses under the FCPA).
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The DOJ has noted some expenditures that are considered
reasonable and bona fide in its "FCPA Reviews."9 5 A DOJ FCPA
Review in 2004 stated that the Fraud Section does not intend to take
action against a business for providing seminar fees, including
transportation costs, meals, and lodging for foreign government
officials.96 In another release, the DOJ stated that it does not intend to
take action against a law firm that will be providing group rate health
insurance and guarantees of future employment to a partner taking a
leave of absence to work for a foreign government. 97 It was proposed
that the final amendments to the FCPA include a provision under
affirmative defenses for "nominal payments, which constitute a courtesy,
a token or regard of esteem, or in return for hospitality," in other
words, tips.98
Thus, the real issue within the grease or illegal payment concept is
the amount of the payment. Currently there is no statutory amount
provided that says no more than this amount is permitted.9 9 However,
from known payments that have occurred, payments under $1000 are
generally safe. 10 Further complicating this is that the courts have not set
any standard.o The author believes this is in part due to the American
uneasiness of addressing how much money constitutes a legal bribe.
There is even an uneasiness of using the word "bribe" in this Article and
using "payment" instead. Bribery is against everything we are taught in
the U.S.; yet this law prescribes when that very act is acceptable.
Thus, companies and individuals must scrutinize every payment to
a foreign official and avoid acting in a manner that may be perceived as
95. See U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT REVIEW, OPINION
PROCEDURE RELEASE No. 04-01 (Jan. 6, 2004), http://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/

criminal-fraud/legacy/2010/04/11/0401.pdf; supra note 91.
96. U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT REVIEw, OPINION
PROCEDURE RELEASE No. 04-01, supranote 95.
97. U.S. DEP'T OF. JUSTICE, FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT, OPINION PROCEDURE

RELEASE No. 2000-01 (Mar. 29, 2000), http://www.usdoj.gov/criniinal/fraud/fcpa/opinion/2000/
0001.pdf.
98.

Marika Maris & Erika Singer, Foreign CorruptPracticesAct, 43 Am. CRIM. L. REV. 575,

588 n.83 (2006). Although this provision was ultimately not adopted, some companies have
incorporated this language into their codes of ethics. See, e.g., AM. MEDIA OPERATIONS, INC.,
AMENDED AND RESTATED CODE OF ETHICS AND CORPORATE CONDUCT FOR THE PRINCIPAL
EXECUTIVE OFFICER AND SENIOR FINANCIAL OFFICERS 13-16 (June 2006), http://www.
americanmediainc.com/sites/americanmediainc.com/files/fin reports/CodeofConductfinal.pdf;
HEXAGON, CODE OF BUSINESS CONDUCT AND ETHICS 6 (May 2016), http://www.hexagon.com/
downloads/HexagonCodeOfBusinessConductEthics.pdf.
99. See, e.g., Cherie 0. Taylor, The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act: A Primer, CURRENTS,
Winter 2008, at 3, 6 (describing the fact there are not set statutory limits).
100. See, e.g., Matthews, supra note 69, at 314-15 (discussing the permissible size of

facilitation payments).
101. Id. at 314.
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trying to influence the decisions and actions of those officials, regardless
of the amount. Businesses and individuals must also ensure that a
rigorous system of internal compliance is in place to mitigate the fines
and penalties imposed by the FCPA in the event that a violation of the
FCPA may occur. Even though small payment amounts that have been
interpreted as bribes to foreign officials have been the subject of
criminal and civil enforcement actions, such bribes can also be subject to
criminal prosecution under the FCPA. 102 The result of these payments
can range from enormous fines to the temporary or permanent exclusion
from federal procurement contracting.10 To avoid such consequences,
businesses should enact a detailed compliance program intended to
detect and prevent improper payments of any amount by all levels of
employees and their agents.
V.

ESTABLISHING INTERNAL COMPLIANCE PROTOCOLS

It is important for businesses to establish FCPA internal compliance
protocols. These protocols are important because of the various potential
legal protections they could provide and violations they can prevent. For
example, even if a business unknowingly violates the FCPA, it can still
be penalized by the DOJ.1" Then, the possible loss of the business's
reputation can be seriously damaging, and thus possibly affect how well
a business operates afterwards with the public. As discussed in the cases
below, this generally has not been an issue for companies that have
violated the FCPA, but nevertheless it is a large concern.
Lastly, if it gets to this point, the federal sentencing guidelines
acknowledge the importance of a business possessing an internal
compliance program and rewards those businesses that have such a
compliance program in place with reduced penalties even if it is found in
violation of the FCPA.10o The United Kingdom ("U.K.") for example,
&

102. See, e.g., Stamm Florian, The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, SMITH, GAMBRELL
LLP (2006), http://www.sgrlaw.com/resources/trusttheleaders/leadersissues/ttll5/
836 (discussing the various criminal and civil penalties in the FCPA).

RUSSELL,

103. Jessica Tillipman, The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act & Government Contractors:
Compliance Trends & Collateral Consequences,BRIEFING PAPERS, Aug. 2011, at 1, 6-8.

104. See S.E.C. v. World-Wide Coin Invest., Ltd., 567 F. Supp. 724, 749 (N.D. Ga. 1983)
(stating that, just as the degree of error is not relevant to responsibility for any inaccuracies in
companies' compliance, the motivations of those who erred are not relevant). However, for aiding

and abetting, knowledge of participation is relevant. S.E.C. v. Autocorp Equities, Inc., 292 F. Supp.
2d 1310, 1331 (D. Utah 2003).
105. See Philip A. Wellner, Note, Effective Compliance Programs and Corporate Criminal
Prosecutions, 27 CARDOZO L. REv. 497, 505-08 (2005) (citing U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES
MANUAL § 8C2.5(f) (2004)) (discussing that the companies who receive the maximum benefit from

robust compliance programs are those that appear to comply with the guidelines but that do not
actually detect or deter wrongful conduct).
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takes a similar approach. The U.K.'s Serious Fraud Office ("SFO")
recognized that the objective of their similar Bribery Act "is not to bring
the full force of the criminal law to bear upon well run commercial
organizations that experience an isolated incident of bribery on their
behalf."l 06 The SFO will take the existence of a company's compliance
program into account when determining whether to prosecute in
situations where a company had an effective compliance system but
neither detected nor deterred rogue employee nor agent activity.1 07
If a business is interested in implementing an internal compliance
program, then it needs to address both internal and external protocols of
the business. The business should provide to its officers, directors, and
all of its employees the business's FCPA compliance protocol and an
outline of the provisions of the FCPA. This protocol should include the
business's policy regarding payments to foreign officials, and-this part
is very crucial-what should be done if the employee or director
suspects questionable payments or discovers that questionable payments
were made."0 s All levels of employees should receive periodic training
on FCPA compliance, depending on the amount of foreign interaction,
at least once a year. As mentioned above, if a company enacts
these procedures, it will be better protected against a rogue
employee's actions.
The company should emphasize the risk to the employee and to the
company if violations of the FCPA are ever found by the U.S.
government, and consider past violations by others that have been
prosecuted. It is strongly suggested that employment agreements, where
applicable, should contain agreements by the prospective employee to
adhere to the FCPA and the business's internal compliance protocol.
This will create an environment of awareness within the business to
prevent accidental violations of the FCPA. As mentioned above, even
inadvertent violations of the FCPA can still be charged, but having a
strong internal compliance protocol will show the U.S. government that
a company has at least attempted to make its employees aware of the
protocols. 109 Depending on the employees' exposure to international
situations, more training and emphasis should be provided by the
company. This reduces the risk of any accidental violations.

106. U.K. MINISTRY OF JUSTICE, THE BRIBERY ACT 2010, at 8 (2010),
https://www.justice.gov.uk/downloads/legislation/bribery-act-2010-guidance.pdf
107. See id.
108. For an example of a company's internal protocols, see PARETEUM CORP., CODE OF
BUsINESS CONDUCT 5-6 (2015), http://www.pareteum.com/corporate-govemance (follow the "Code
of Business Conduct" hyperlink).
109. See Matthews, supranote 69, at 52-53; supranote 103 and accompanying text.
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Within the company's internal protocol, the company must
emphasize and promote open and easy lines of communication. This
allows employees to report any suspicious payment made by other
employees of any level, to determine whether a proposed payment might
violate the FCPA. To ensure effective compliance, it is suggested that
companies appoint an internal compliance officer to manage the protocol
and be the contact person for any employee's question about proposed
payments possibly violating the FCPA, and reporting any violations that
have been made. Obviously, this person must be very knowledgeable
about the FCPA and serve the interest of the company, not of any one
individual employee or group of employees. Depending on the size of
the company, this may consist of an existing employee taking on this
responsibility, but it is important to have someone that is the point
person for any FCPA issues to be able to act independently of
supervisory control that may have interests contrary to the FCPA.
A company's internal compliance protocol can get complicated
where the company uses outside consultants or foreign agents. In
addition, doing business through joint ventures or partnerships with
foreign business entities can complicate compliance. The use of foreign
agents and entities by companies expands each year and will continue to
do so as the economies of the world continue to intertwine.110 Many of
the cases that will be discussed below involve this very situation;
whether each company knew of the violations and allowed them to
continue is a matter of debate, but conducting business with foreign
agents and entities caused many of the issues."'
It may not always be easy to accomplish, but all companies need to
ensure that their foreign partners are FCPA compliant. Ignorance of the
law is not an excuse, and neither is the ignorance of a business partner's
violations of the FCPA as per DOJ interpretations of the law.' 12 A
company's foreign partner's violation of the FCPA does not protect the
company from being found in violation itself." 3 Because a company
may be held liable for the actions of its foreign partners, each needs to
conduct due diligence to establish FCPA compliance of potential foreign
partners before entering into the relationship. This can be accomplished
110. See Daniel J. Grimm, Traversing the Minefield: Joint Ventures and the Foreign Corrupt
PracticesAct, 9 VA. L. & Bus. REV. 91, 97-100 (2014).
111. See supra Part IV.
112. There is some debate to this statement. Under the FCPA, an individual cannot be punished
criminally unless he acts "willfully." 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-2(g)(2)(A) (2012). However, Congress did
not define the term in the Act, and subsequent court decisions have failed to analyze the willfulness
provision rigorously. See id
113. See Grimm, supra note 110, at 16-43 (discussing the different concerns of foreign
partners).
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easily when conducting investigations of the partner before doing
business with them.
It is suggested that a company complete a thorough background
investigation into its potential new foreign business partner. This
includes running all parties through the Office of Foreign Assets Control
("OFAC") sanctions list and all other officially maintained blacklists.114
Any proposed foreign partnership or venture should be preceded by a
period of due diligence in relation to the FCPA."'
In the course of due diligence, the company should answer some
questions before proceeding with the relationship. For example, does the
local entity have any relationships with government officials? If it does,
in what capacity? Will the entity be in a position where its staff might be
tempted to offer a bribe? The company must consider whether the entity
will be capable of complying with the FCPA in relation to the
permissibility of facilitating payments and prohibited bribes. This
includes reputation of the entity as well as any possible violations that
entity may have committed in the past.116
Furthermore, disclosing a business's internal compliance protocol
and making the relationship contingent upon written guarantees from the
organization to adhere to the same protocol is suggested."' This can be
simply included in any contractual relationship between the company
and the foreign partner."' If the compliance of the internal protocols
were emphasized in any business relationship contract, this would show
the government that best efforts were exercised to be compliant with the
FCPA, and would show employees commitment to adhere to the FCPA.
In addition, if the partnership could result in a long-term relationship, the
initial background check of the entity should be updated at least yearly
to ensure continued compliance by the entity under the FCPA.
Additionally, requiring that the foreign entities keep accurate
accounting records makes it more difficult to mask improper payments
that could be made. Insisting upon accurate accounting, receipts, and
annual audits by certified public accountants will help discourage bribes
from being paid, and bring to light improper payments if they do happen.
114.

See Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC),

U.S.

DEP'T

OF THE

TREASURY,

https://www.treasury.gov/about/organizational-structure/offices/Pages/Office-of-Foreign-AssetsControl.aspx (last visited Aug. 1, 2017).
115.

See Jaime Guerrero, Regulatory: 7 Points to Considerin Regard to FCPA Due Diligence,

INSIDE COUNSEL (Apr. 25, 2012), http://www.insidecounsel.com/2012/04/25/regulatory-7-pointsto-consider-in-regard-to-fcpa (discussing how to protect a company from joint venture partners and
agents).
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. Id.
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This will provide a company with an opportunity to correct the situation
and possibly self-report the incident if the event requires it. If it is
necessary for the foreign entity to make a payment that a compliance
officer believes would qualify for the facilitating payments exception,
then both parties should identify it accordingly in their accounts. This is
an important and often overlooked aspect of the FCPA. 119 If proper
records of the facilitating payments have been kept, it will provide
protection in any U.S. government investigation, or in another country
that may have similar laws where both parties are doing business.
Lastly, companies should establish a reliable structure to maintain
regular oversight. Companies that are operating in foreign countries
while keeping management mostly in the U.S. must scrutinize their
foreign activities carefully. If the operations rely on foreign entities to
operate, then the oversight becomes even more critical.
VI.

RECENT CASES: 2016

The following cases show what action the U.S. government has
taken in 2016 in enforcing the FCPA.120 The Article provides a brief
synopsis of some of the cases, illustrating the behavior that got the
company in trouble. The companies that did not address the "three
questions" discussed above paid heavily for it. All figures are presented

in U.S. dollars.
A.

SAP SE

In February 2016, the SEC found that SAP SE violated the FCPA
by allowing Vicente E. Garcia, a SAP SE executive, to bribe a senior
Panamanian government official, and offer bribes to two others.121 In
addition to paying the bribe, Garcia hid the activity as large discountsup to 82%-by easily falsifying approval forms. 12 2 The SEC focused on
the lack of internal FCPA controls to prohibit these questionable
discounts. 123 This will be a recurring theme in these cases. SAP SE
agreed to pay disgorgement of $3.7 million in profits to the Panamanian

119. Strauss, supra note 81, at 251-58 (discussing how the SEC and DOJ have prosecuted
parties for failing to have properly recorded facilitating payments).
120. See SEC Enforcement Actions: FCPA Cases, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM'N, https://www.
sec.gov/spotlight/fcpa/fcpa-cases.shtml (last visited Aug. 1, 2017). This Article discusses only those
cases from 2016 listed by the SEC. See infra Part VI.A-Y.
121. Vicente E. Garcia, Exchange Act Release No. 75684, 112 S.E.C. Docket 3 (Aug. 12,
2015).
122. Id.
123. Id.
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of $188,896

1139

to

settle

B. Ignacio Cueto Plaza
Also in February 2016, the SEC alleged that Ignacio Cueto Plaza,
chief executive officer of LAN Airlines, based in South America,
violated the FCPA by allowing a third-party consultant to use $1.15
million to bribe union officials. The union was to take a lower wage
increase and stop a labor dispute instead of using the money to study the
air routes in Argentina. 125 Cueto Plaza violated the internal controls,
books and records, and false records provisions of the FCPA. 126 He
neither admitted nor denied the charges, but did agree to pay a $75,000
penalty and become certified with the airline's internal policies and
procedures on FCPA protocols.127 Since he was the president and chief
operating officer at the time, the SEC went after him directly since he
was leading the company.' 28 This is different from the other cases
because this was not an employee, subsidiary, or associate of the
company, but the head officer of the company.
C. SciClone Pharmaceuticals
Again in February 2016, the SEC settled with SciClone
Pharmaceuticals, Inc. ("SciClone"), alleging improper conduct during
the previous five years, including giving money, gifts, and other things
of value to health care professionals in China.1 29 These bribes "led to
several million dollars in sales of pharmaceutical products to China's
state health institutions."' 30 SciClone failed to accurately record these
bribes and lacked an effective anti-corruption compliance program."'
Without admitting or denying the findings, SciClone agreed to pay $9.43
million in disgorgement plus $900,000 in prejudgment interest and a
$2.5 million penalty.13 2

124. Id.
125. Ignacio Cueto Plaza, Exchange Act Release No. 77057, 113 S.E.C. Docket 8 (Feb. 4,
2016).
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. Id
129. Press Release, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Conun'n, SciClone Charged with FCPA Violations
(Feb. 4, 2016), http://www.sec.gov/litigation/admin/2016/34-77058-s.pdf.
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. Id.
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In addition to the monetary settlement, SciClone must report to the
33
SEC for the next three years on anti-corruption compliance measures.'
This company did not have internal protocols in place to prevent this
from happening.13 4 This should be a wake-up call for all companies
doing international business to have strong internal protocols in place
before conducting business overseas.
D.

PTC

In another case from February 2016, the SEC found that PTC Inc.
135
bribed Chinese government officials in order to win business. The
bribes included improper travel, gifts, and entertainment totaling nearly
$1.5 million. 3 6 Not only did the company bribe the officials, but it
disguised the payments as legitimate commissions or business
expenses, ' which is a common theme in these cases.
In this case, the company's subsidiaries were the entities making
the bribes. 138 PTC Inc. agreed to pay $11.86 million and $1.76 million in
prejudgment interest; its two China subsidiaries also agreed to pay a
$14.54 million fine in a non-prosecution agreement.1 39 Subsidiaries in
foreign countries should have protocols in place to monitor their
actitivies on the same level as their parent company.
E.

VimpelCom

In what was the fifth case in February 2016, the SEC alleged that
VimpelCom bribed an Uzbek government official who was related to the
President of Uzbekistan. 140 The company paid at least $114 million in
bribes disguised as charitable donations to organizations that were
directly associated with the Uzbek official.14' The SEC and VimpelCom
agreed on a settlement.1 42 The resolution, which is large, states the
company needs "to pay $167.5 million to the SEC, $230.1 million to the
43
[DOJ], and $397.5 million to Dutch regulators."l
133. Id.
134. Id.
135. PTC Inc., Exchange Act Release No. 77145, 113 S.E.C. Docket 10 (Feb. 16, 2016).
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. Id.
140. Press Release, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm'n, VimpelCom to Pay $795 Million in Global
Settlement for FCPA Violations (Feb. 18, 2016), https://www.sec.gov/news/pressrelease/
2016-34.html.
141. Id.
142. Id.
143. Id.
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The actions by the company were considered so egregious that the
SEC ordered the company to retain an independent monitor to ensure
FCPA compliance for at least three years. 1" This case shows that if a
company does not follow its own protocols or refuses to install them, the
consequences could include an independent entitiy watching the
business and making sure it follows the rules. Most buisnesses would
not like this form of monitoring, so it is best to make sure internal
protocols are established and are being followed.
F.

Qualcomm

In March 2016, the SEC brought a case against Qualcomm, which
allegedly bribed Chinese officials to obtain business.' 4 5 The bribes were
not just limited to gifts, travel, and entertainment, but also included
hiring Chinese officials' family members.' 46 Each family member was
referred to during the hiring process as a "must place" or "special"
hire.147 All of these bribes were misrepresented in the books and records
of Qualcomm as legitimate business expenses.1 48
Qualcomm agreed to pay $7.5 million and self-report on FCPA
compliance to the SEC for the next two years.1 49 This means the
company has to establish strong internal FCPA protocols and show it is
following its own design.
G.

Nordion and Gourevitch

In March 2016, the SEC charged Mikhail Gourevitch for bribing
Russian officials to approve the distribution of a liver cancer treatment
called TheraSphere.'s In Gourevitch's attempt to hide the bribe, he filed
false documentation to conceal it."' In addition to charging Gourevitch,
the SEC also charged Nordion, Inc. ("Nordion") which lacked internal
FCPA protocols, and thus the company was unable to detect and stop
any actions revolving around bribes. 152 Mikhail Gourevitch has been
terminated from his job at Nordion.153
144.
145.
146.
147.
148.
149.
150.
2016).
151.
152.
153.

Id.
Qualcomm Inc., Exchange Act Release No. 77261, 113 S.E.C. Docket 12 (Mar. 1, 2016).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Mikhail Gourevitch, Exchange Act Release No. 77288, 113 S.E.C. Docket 12 (Mar. 3,
Id.
Id.
Id.
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Nevertheless, Gourevitch agreed to pay $100,000 in disgorgement,
15 4
$12,950 in prejudgment interest, and a $66,000 penalty. Nordion has
agreed to pay $375,000 due to its lack of basic internal FCPA protocols
in detecting such activities.155 This case shows again the importance of
having internal FCPA protocols in place.
H. Novartis
In the last case in March 2016, the SEC found that two China-based
subsidiaries of Novartis AG, a pharmaceutical company, were bribing
health care professionals which led to several million dollars of sales for
each."' The company did not have interal FCPA protocols in place to
7
detect and stop these bribes from happening. 15 Novartis AG agreed to
pay $21.5 million in disgorgement, plus $1.5 million in prejudgment
interest and a $2 million civil penalty.' In addition to the monetary
penalties, the pharmaceutical company must report back to the SEC for
two years on its implementation of an internal FCPA protocol and its
compliance with the program. 159
I. Las Vegas Sands
In April 2016, Las Vegas Sands was found to have paid a
consultant in Asia $62 million more than what was recorded in its
internal books.1 60 The money was used to separate company purchases
from purchases by the consultant.16' The purchases were a basketball
team and a building in China.1 6 2 The reason behind these deceptive
63
purchases is that the Chinese government prohibited casino gambling.1
The company agreed to pay $9 million and have an independent
consultant review its internal FCPA protocols for two years to ensure
64
compliance with the FCPA.1

154.
155.
156.
157.
158.
159.
160.
2016).
161.
162.
163.
164.

Id.
Id.
Novartis AG, Exchange Act Release No. 77431, 113 S.E.C. Docket 15 (Mar. 23, 2016).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Las Vegas Sands Corp., Exchange Act Release No. 77555, 113 S.E.C. Docket 17 (Apr. 7,
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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J. Nortek andAkamai Technologies
On June 7, 2016, the SEC announced that two unrelated companies
entered into non-prosecution agreements with the SEC because they
bribed Chinese officials via foreign subsidiaries. 165 The companies were
Akamai Technologies, a Massachusetts-based Internet Service Provider,
and Nortek Inc., a Rhode Island-based residential and commercial
building products manufacturer. 166 Each company self-reported to the
government in the early stages of their own internal investigations. 6 1
As a result of their self-reporting, the SEC agreed to nonprosecution agreements.16 1 Akamai Technologies agreed to pay
$652,452 in disgorgement plus $19,433 in interest, while Nortek Inc.
agreed to pay $291,403 in disgorgement plus $30,655 in interest.1 69 Even
though these companies' internal FCPA protocols did not prevent the
illegal actions, monitoring practices saved the company money in
avoiding SEC prosecution.
K.

Analogic andLars Frost

In June 2016, the SEC, Analogic Corp., and Lars Frost (chief
financial officer of BK Medical ApS ("BK Medical"), an Analogic
subsidiary) agreed to a $15 million dollar settlement for FCPA
violations.170 Analogic used its Danish subsidiary, BK Medical, to
funnel $20 million to individuals in Russia and to shell companies in
Belize, the British Virgin Islands, Cyprus, and Seychelles."' The $20
million came from BK Medical distributors, at Analogic Corp.'s request,
to fictitiously inflate its invoices to the distributors and direct the
overpayments to the requested third parties. 7 2
BK Medical had no knowledge of whether these payments had any
business purpose, and it was able to sign a non-prosecution agreement
and pay $3.4 million.173 Analogic Corp., being the parent of said bribery,
has agreed to pay $7.67 million in disgorgement and $3.8 million in
prejudgment interest. 7 4 The fines were mitigated by the fact the
165. Press Release, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm'n, SEC Announces Two Non-Prosecution
Agreements in FCPA Cases (June 7, 2016), https://www.sec.gov/news/pressrelease/2016-109.html.
166. Id.
167. Id.
168. Id.
169. Id.
170. Analogic Corp., Exchange Act Release No. 78113, 114 S.E.C. Docket 8 (June 21, 2016).
171. Id.
172. Id.
173. Id.
174. Id
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company self-reported, took remedial measures, and cooperated with the
government investigation.175
L. Johnson Controls
In July 2016, the SEC settled with Johnson Controls, Inc. ("Johnson
Controls") for $14 million over FCPA violations.176 Johnson Controls's
fully-owned Chinese subsidiary was using fake vendors to bribe
government-owned shipyards, ship owners, and others."' These bribes
were made hoping to obtain future business, to retain current business,
and to help itself. 7 s The subsidiary is called China Marine,
which Johnson Controls acquired in 2005.1 Prior to the acquisition,
China Marine was using agents to funnel money to the government
and others.s0
When Johnson Controls took over the company it implemented
rules to limit using agents, and the managing director started using fake
vendors.'' Johnson Controls did not admit or deny the findings but did
report the misdeeds to the SEC and had to pay back the amount of
profits obtained by this illegal transaction of $11.8 million plus
prejudgment interest of $1.38 million and a civil penalty of $1.18
million."' Johnson Controls also needs to report to the SEC for a year
on the status of remediation and implementation of anti-corruption
compliance measures."' This is another example of a company not
having a strong enough protocol in place to prevent this type of incident.
M

LAN Airlines

In a July 2016 corporate enforcement action, following the
individual action against Ignacio Cueto Plaza, LAN Airlines settled
184
charges that it used a consultant that made payments to third parties.
The company was inculpated for its role in creating a contract knowing
full well that it was not intended to pay a purported consultant $1.15

175.
176.
2016).
177.
178.
179.
180.
181.
182.
183.
184.
2016).

Id.
Johnson Controls, Inc., Exchange Act Release No. 78287, 114 S.E.C. Docket 11 (July 11,
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
LAN Airlines S.A., Exchange Act Release No. 78402, 114 S.E.C. Docket 13 (July 25,
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million in studying the existing air routes in Argentina.' The money
instead went to third parties to squash the union's disputes." LAN
Airlines agreed to pay $9.4 million in illegally gained profits and a
$12.75 million penalty. 1 7 In addition to the fines, LAN Airlines agreed
to have an independent company monitor its activities for the next
twenty-seven months.188

N.

Key Energy Services

In August 2016, the SEC settled a case with Key Energy Services,
Inc. ("Key Energy") for $5 million.1 89 Key Energy, a Houston-based
company, had a Mexican subsidiary called Key Mexico pay a contracted
employee at Petroleos Mexicanos ("Pemex") for advice, assistance, and
inside information.190 Key Mexico officials falsified those records to
keep Key Energy out of the loop."' Through an internal investigation in
2014, Key Energy discovered the relationship between the Pemex
employee and Key Mexico. 19 2 Key Energy did not admit to or deny the
violations of the FCPA but agreed to pay $5 million in illegally attained
profits.' No penalty was charged due to Key Energy's current financial
situation, which means the SEC did not want to impose a fine that would
force the company to close. 194
0.

AstraZeneca

Near the end of August 2016, the SEC settled with AstraZeneca plc
("AstraZeneca") for its FCPA violations. 9 Subsidiaries of AstraZeneca
were bribing foreign officials in both China and Russia.1 96 These bribes
included cash, gifts, and many other items. 19 7 The bribes lasted for
several years and were even condoned by multiple levels of

185. Id.
186. Id.
18 7. Id.
188. Id.
189. Key Energy Services, Inc., Exchange Act Release No. 78558, 114 S.E.C. Docket 15 (Aug.
11,2016).
190. Id.
191. Id.
192. Id.
193. Id.
194. Id.
195. AstraZeneca PLC, Exchange Act Release No. 78730, 114 S.E.C. Docket 18 (Aug. 30,
2016).
196. Id.
197. Id.

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 2017

27

Hofstra Law Review, Vol. 45, Iss. 4 [2017], Art. 9

HOFSTRA LA W RE VIEW

1146

[Vol. 45:1119

management.19 8 AstraZeneca also had no anti-corruption compliance
program during the period of the bribery.1 99 Again, it is essential that a
company have an established program.
The company did not admit or deny the findings but agreed to pay

$4.33 million in illegally obtained profits, $822,000 in prejudgment
interest, and a civil penalty of $375,000.200 As the company created an
anti-corruption compliance program after these incidents occurred, no
mandate to create one is within the SEC's order.20 1
P. Jun Ping Zhang
Jun Ping Zhang, a former subsidiary executive at an international
communications and information technology company, Harris
Corporation, located in China, agreed to settle charges that it bribed
Chinese government officials in an effort to acquire new business and
maintain current business.2 02 In addition, Ping Zhang falsified records to
203
Harris Corporation
hide the expenses and hoped not to be caught.
204
acquired the subsidiary and took immediate action to fix the error.
Ping Zhang will pay a $46,000 civil penalty, while Harris Corporation
will not need to pay because of the self-reporting, remediation and
cooperation with the SEC.205

Q.

Nu Skin Enterprises

The SEC found that a Chinese subsidiary of Nu Skin Enterprises,
Inc., a Provo, Utah-based company, made a payment to a charity in order
to influence a high-ranking Chinese Communist party official in order to
20 6
The SEC's investigation
quell an investigation into their company.
noted that the Chinese subsidiary, Nu Skin (China) Daily Use & Health
Products Co. Ltd. was being threatened with a $431,088 fine from an
internal Chinese investigation. 20 7 The Chinese subsidiary approached a
government official and asked for his intervention on the fine in

198. Id
199. Id
200. Id.
201. Id.
202. Jun Ping Zhang, Exchange Act Release No. 78825, 114 S.E.C. Docket 20 (Sept. 13,
2016).
203. Id.
204. Id.
205. See id.
206. Nu Skin Enterprises, Inc., Exchange Act Release No. 78884, 115 S.E.C. Docket 1 (Sept.
20, 2016).
207. Id.
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exchange for a charitable donation in the same amount to his charity.208
Nu Skin Enterprises Inc., without admitting or denying the findings,
agreed to a cease-and-desist order to disgorge illegally gained profits of
$431,088, pay a prejudgment interest of $34,600, plus a civil penalty
of $300,000.209
R. Anheuser-Busch InBev
Anheuser-Busch InBev, a Leuven, Belgium-based company, was
using third-party sales promoters to bribe government officials in
India. 2 10 Not only did it bribe government officials, but it had a
separation agreement that put heavy financial penalties on anyone who
would report these bribes to the SEC. 2 11 Anheuser-Busch InBev has
agreed to pay $2.71 million in illegally obtained profits, prejudgment
interest of $292,381, and a $3 million penalty.2 12 In addition to the
financial settlement, the company must cooperate with the SEC and stop
prohibiting employees from contacting the SEC.213 It is hard for a
company to claim any form of ignorance when it punishes employees for
contacting the SEC.
S.

Och-Ziff

Och-Ziff Capital Management Group ("Och-Ziff') bribed highlevel government officials in Africa to persuade the Libyan Investment
Authority sovereign wealth fund ("SWF") invest in Och-Ziff.214 The
bribes also included mining rights to government officials in Libya,
Chad, Niger, Guinea, and the Democratic Republic of the Congo. 215 Not
only did Och-Ziff violate the Exchange Act, but Oz Management, an
associated investment consultant, violated the anti-fraud provisions of
the Investment Advisers Act of 1940.216 The companies have agreed to
disgorge $173.2 million in illegally gained profits and $25.86 million in
interest, without admitting or denying the findings.2 17 The criminal

208. Id.
209. Id.
210. Anheuser-Busch InBev SA/NV, Exchange Act Release No. 78957, 115 S.E.C. Docket 2
(Sept. 28, 2016).
211. Id.
212. Id.
213. Id.
214. Och-Ziff Capital Mgmt. Grp. LLC, Exchange Act Release No. 78989, 115 S.E.C.
Docket 2, (Sept. 29, 2016).
215. Id.
216. Id.
217. Id.
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penalty is expected to be $213 million after both parties agreed to enter a
deferred prosecution agreement ("DPA").218
T.

GlaxoSmithKline

The SEC claims that GlaxoSmithKline plc transferred money, gifts,
and others things to health care professionals in China that led to
increased sales.219 GlaxoSmithKline plc has agreed to settle the charges
by paying a $20 million civil penalty and providing the SEC with status
reports of remediation and anti-corruption compliance measures. 220
U.

Embraer

Embraer S.A., an aircraft manufacturer, was using third-parties to
bribe government officials in the Dominican Republic, Saudi Arabia,
Mozambique, and India. 221 These bribes led to the company securing
contracts in said countries.222 The bribes included payments of $3.52
million to an official in the Dominican Republic, $1.65 million to an
official in Saudi Arabia, an alleged $800,000 to an official in
Mozambique, and about $5.76 million to an agent in India.22 3 The
settlement includes that Embraer S.A. must pay $107 million in a DPA,
and $98 million in disgorgement and prejudgment interest. 22 4 If the

Brazilian authorities charge Embraer S.A. in civil proceedings, Embraer
S.A. may receive a credit up to $20 million. 22 5 Not only does Embraer
S.A. need to pay the penalty, but it needs to have an independent
monitor for at least three years.226
V. JPMorgan Chase
JPMorgan's subsidiary in Asia bypassed its normal hiring process
to create a client referral hiring program in order to influence
government officials to achieve new business and maintain business
relationships. 227 Across a seven-year period, about 100 interns or full218.
219.
2016).
220.
221.
Charges
222.
223.
224.
225.
226.
227.

Id.
GlaxoSmithKline plc, Exchange Act Release No. 79005, 115 S.E.C. Docket 2 (Sept. 30,
Id.
Press Release, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm'n, Embraer Paying $205 Million to Settle FCPA
(Oct. 24, 2016), https://www.sec.gov/news/pressrelease/2016-224.html.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
JPMorgan Chase & Co., Exchange Act Release No. 79335, 115 S.E.C. Docket 9 (Nov. 17,
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time employees were hired at the request of Asia-Pacific government
officials. 228 As there was no FCPA protocol or any kind of anticorruption plan in place, the record showed that JPMorgan started
separating revenue they received from the government officials' referral
hires from other revenue.229 JPMorgan has agreed to pay $105.51
million in illegally obtained profits plus $25.08 million in interest to
settle the case.230
W

Braskem

Braskem S.A., a Brazillian-based petrochemical manufacturer,
settled with the U.S., Swiss, and Brazillian governments in the amount
of $957 million as a result of bribing Brazillian government officials to
win or retain business. 23 1 The company did not have adequate internal
protocols to prevent such payments from occurring.232 The settlement
amounted to paying back $325 million in illegal profits made from the
bribes and $632 million in criminal penalties and fines. 233 The company
will be overseen by an independent monitor for three years.234
X

Teva Pharmaceutical

Teva Pharmaceutical Industries Ltd. agreed to pay $519 million in
civil and criminal penalties for its actions of bribing government
officials in Russia, Ukraine, and Mexico. 235 The company failed to
"devise and maintain" the proper internal protocols that may have
prevented these types of bribes. 236 As with many other cases, the bribes
were concealed as proper payments in record keeping.237

2016).
228. Id.
229. Id.
2 3 0. Id.
231. Press Release, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm'n, Petrochemical Manufacturer Braskem S.A. to
Pay $957 Million to Settle FCPA Charges (Dec. 21, 2016), https://www.sec.gov/news/
pressrelease/2016-271.html.
232. Id
233. Id.
234. Id.
235. Press Release, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm'n, Teva Pharmaceutical Paying $519 Million to
Settle FCPA Charges (Dec. 22, 2016), https://www.sec.gov/news/pressrelease/2016-277.html.
236. Id.
237. Id.
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General Cable Corporation

The Kentucky-based General Cable Corporation, agreed to pay
$81.5 million across three different actions taken by the U.S.
government.238 The improper payments were made to various countries
around the world and continued for twelve years.23 9 In addition,
employees of the company had to pay various amounts in settle separate
actions with the U.S. government.240
VH.

RECENT

CASES: 2015

The following cases show what action the U.S. government took in
2015 in enforcing the FCPA. Like the 2016 cases, these companies did
not follow the "three questions" discussed earlier, these companies
ignored them and paid for it. All figures are in U.S. dollars.
A.

Bristol-Myers Squibb

The New York-based pharmaceutical manufacturer, Bristol-Myers
Squibb Company, agreed to pay $14 million in fines to the American
government. 241 The settlement was a result of the company not
responding to red flags indicating its employees were making bribes.242
The company also did not investigate claims by its employees that bribes
had been made, and was slow to fix internal protocols when issues were
discovered. 243 For two years, the company must report to the U.S.
government its efforts to install and fix existing FCPA measures. 24
B.

Hitachi

The SEC charged Tokyo-based conglomerate Hitachi, Ltd. with
violating the FCPA when it did not properly record payments to South
Africa's ruling political party. 245 The improper payments were disguised

238. General Cable Corp., Exchange Act Release No. 79702, 115 S.E.C. Docket 15 (Dec. 29,
2016).
239. Id.
240. Id.
241. Bristol-Myers Squibb Co., Exchange Act Release No. 76073, 112 S.E.C. Docket 11 (Oct.
5,2015).
242. Id
243. Id
244. Id.
245. Press Release, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm'n, SEC Charges Hitachi With FCPA Violations
(Aug. 18, 2015), http://www.sec.gov/news/pressrelease/2015-212.html; see also Compl. at 1-3,
S.E.C. v. Hitachi, Ltd., No. 1:15-cv-01573 (D.D.C. Sept. 28, 2015).
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in an attempt to hide that they were made in order to obtain contracts to
build two multi-billion dollar power plants in South Africa.246
As a result, Hitachi agreed to pay a $19 million civil penalty to
settle the claim.247 This type of violation is difficult to prevent because it
was orchestrated at the highest levels of the company and thus possibly
above a compliance officer's ability to detect.
C. BNY Mellon
The SEC announced that The Bank of New York Mellon
Corporation ("BNY Mellon") agreed to pay $8.3 million in
disgorgement, $1.5 million in interest, and a $5 million penalty for a
total of $14.8 million.2 48 The amount was paid was to settle FCPA
violations by BNY Mellon for providing student internships to family
members of government officials, who were not otherwise qualified,
connected to a Middle Eastern-based SWF from 2010 to 2011 in return
for business. 249
The company offered the student internship positions to the SWF
family members, but not through the normal, existing, highly
competitive internship program process that BNY Mellon used.250 As a
result, the SWF family members did not meet the normal rigorous
criteria but were still hired in an attempt to influence the SWF officials
and win or retain contracts with the SWF.251
The government claimed there were insufficient internal protocols
to control the hiring process at BNY Mellon, which as a result could not
detect the hiring of the family members of the SWF. 25 2 The U.S.
government emphasized that BNY Mellon's human resources personnel
were not properly trained to detect potentially problematic hires,
including these interns. 253 BNY Mellon's internal protocols were
"insufficiently tailored to the corruption risks inherent in the hiring of
client referrals, and therefore was inadequate to fully effectuate BNY
Mellon's stated policy against bribery of foreign officials."254

246. Id.
247. Id.
248. The Bank of New York Mellon Corp., Exchange Act Release No. 75720, 112 S.E.C.
Docket 4 (Aug. 18, 2015).
249. Id.
250. Id
251. Id.
252. Id.
253. Id.
254. Press Release, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm'n, SEC Charges BNY Mellon with FCPA
Violations (Aug. 18, 2015), https://www.sec.gov/news/pressrelease/2015-170.html.
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Vicente E. Garcia

'

The SEC announced that Vicente E. Garcia, a former vice president
at worldwide software manufacturer, SAP SE, agreed to settle charges
that he violated the anti-bribery provisions of the FCPA in a deal with
Panamanian government officials in an attempt to obtain software
license sales for his company and receive kickbacks on those deals at the
same time.255 The investigation found that Garcia, who was fired from
SAP SE in April 2014, orchestrated a scheme from 2009 to 2013, to pay
$145,000 in bribes to Panamanian government officials in order to
obtain contracts to sell SAP SE's software to the Panamanian
government and receive kickbacks at the same time.256
Garcia caused SAP SE, a Germany based company, to "sell
software to a partner in Panama at discounts of up to 82%.",257 Garcia
avoided his company's internal protocols by submitting falsified forms
stating the reasons for the discounts and their approvals.258 This action
by Garcia however, insulated SAP SE from FCPA violations. 259 The
excessive discounts enabled his partner in Panama to establish a slush
fund for the purpose of bribing Panamanian government officials so SAP
SE could then sell the software. 26 0 This arrangement allowed Garcia to
receive kickbacks into his personal bank account.26
Garcia used both his company and personal e-mail accounts to
"communicate details of the bribery scheme and even identify the
government officials and intended monetary amounts." 2 62 In one e-mail,
Garcia attached a letter on company letterhead falsifying details of a
meeting in Mexico to acquire between $5 and $10 million. 2 63 Garcia
agreed to pay "$85,965, which is the total amount of kickbacks he
received, plus prejudgment interest of $6,430 for a total of $92,395" to
the U.S. government.264

255. Press Release, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm'n, SEC Charges Former Software Executive
with FCPA Violations (Aug. 12, 2015), https://www.sec.gov/news/pressrelease/2015-165.html.
256. Id.
257. Id.
258. Id
259. Id.
260. Id.
261. Id.
262. Id.
263. Id.
264. Id
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Mead Johnson

The SEC charged Mead Johnson Nutrition Company, an Illinoisbased company, with violating the FCPA's books and records and
internal controls provisions when "its Chinese subsidiary made improper
payments to health care professionals (HCP) at government-owned
hospitals to recommend the company's infant formula to patients who
were new or expectant mothers."26 5 Mead Johnson has internal protocols
prohibiting improper payments and gifts to health care professionals, but
failed to follow them.266 As a result, the company agreed to pay $12
million to settle the U.S. government's finding.2 67 The $12.03 million
consisted of $7.77 million in fines, $1.26 million in interest, and a $3
million civil penalty.268
The company had internal protocol procedures in place, but its
lackadaisical environment enabled its subsidiary to use off-the-books
funds to pay doctors and other health care professionals in China to
recommend its baby formula and give the company marketing access to
mothers.269 The government's order reflecting a settled administrative
proceeding found that the company violated the books and records and
internal control provisions of the FCPA.270
F. BHP Billiton
The SEC has charged BHP Billiton, a mining and natural resource
company based in England and Australia, with violating the FCPA when
it invited 176 foreign government officials and their families to the 2008
Summer Olympics in Beijing, China; many of them accepted and went
to China at BHP Billiton's expense. 2 7 1 The company agreed to pay a
penalty of $25 million in civil fines to settle the FCPA violations,
without admitting or denying any of the allegations.2 72
The company was an official sponsor of the 2008 Olympics and
supplied the raw materials to make the medals. 2 73 The U.S.
government's investigation discovered that the company failed to (1)
265. Press Release, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm'n, SEC Charges Mead Johnson Nutrition with
FCPA Violations (July 28, 2015), https://www.sec.gov/news/pressrelease/2015-154.html.
266. Id.
267. Id.
268. Id
269. Id.
270. Id
271. BHP Billiton Ltd., Exchange Act Release No. 74998, 111 S.E.C. Docket 11 (May 20,
2015).
272. Id.
273. Id.
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develop sufficient internal protocols to prevent what happened in China;
and (2) maintain sufficient internal controls over its actions connected to
the company's sponsorship of the Olympic Games.274
The result was that the company paid for sixty people of the
original 176 invited as well as twenty-four spouses and others who
attended the Olympics along with them. 2 75 The guests that did accept
BHP Billiton's invitation to attend received "three-and-four-day
hospitality packages that included event tickets, luxury hotel
accommodations, and sightseeing excursions valued at $12,000 to
$16,000 per package." 2 76
As part of the settlement, in which the company neither admitted
nor denied the government's findings, the company agreed to report
back to regulators on the operation of its FCPA and anti-corruption
compliance program for a one-year period.277 The U.S. government
noted five areas specifically: (1) the company did not require
independent compliance review; (2) the information on the application
forms were at times inaccurate or incomplete; (3) even though the
company had internal protocols in place, the company failed to train
employees on them; (4) the company, within its protocols, did not have a
means of updating or reassessing the appropriateness of the applications;
and (5) the company's protocols did not require communication between
various business units.278
G.

FLIR Systems

The SEC charged the U.S. based company, FLIR Systems Inc.
("FLIR"), with violating the FCPA by financing a "world tour" of
personal travel and gifts such as watches and entertainment for
government officials from Saudi Arabia and Egypt who were in position
to make decisions to purchase FLIR products. 27 9 The company earned
more than $7 million in profits from sales influenced by the world tour
provided to Saudi Arabian officials from the Ministry of Interior. 280
The company settled the charges by paying more than $9.5 million,
which included disgorgement of $7.53 million, interest of $1 million,
274. Id.
275. Id.
276. Press Release, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm'n, SEC Charges BHP Billiton with Violating
FCPA at Olympic Games (May 20, 2015), https://www.sec.gov/news/pressrelease/2015-93.html.
277. Id.
278. Id
279. FUR Systems, Inc., Exchange Act Release No. 74673, 111 S.E.C. Docket 5 (Apr. 8,
2015).
280. Id.

http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlr/vol45/iss4/9

36

Smith: The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act: Set Aside the Moral and Ethica

OPERATING WITHIN THE FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT

2017]

1155

and a penalty of another $1 million.28 1 Furthermore, the company had to
report its FCPA compliance efforts to the U.S. government for the next
two years.282 This included the requirement of building strong internal
protocols and training, but this company has a history of violating the
FCPA.283 A year earlier, the government charged two FLIR employees,
stemming from this same case.284
According to the government's order against FLIR, the company
had few internal protocols concerning travel out of its foreign sales
offices as compared to its domestic operations. 28 5 FLIR also had few
internal protocols addressing gift-giving to clients. For example, two
employees in its Dubai office provided expensive watches to
government officials from Saudi Arabia for $7123 and labeled the
submission executive gifts. 286 The same two employees arranged for the
company to pay for world trips by these government officials which
included stops in North Africa, the Middle East, Europe, and the U.S.,
costing over $43,000.287 If the gifts were not already a clear violation of
the FCPA, it also falsely recorded the value of the gifts and the extent
and nature of the travel. 288 The SEC order stated that the travel expenses,
watches, and other gifts were given to Saudi government officials.289
The government also found that FLIR accepted "cursory invoices" from
a partner, who the company reimbursed for a non-essential visit to
France, which included amounts paid for Egyptian officials without any
supporting documentation.2 90
The company self-reported the misconduct of two of its employees,
but it only reported to the U.S. government and cooperated with the
investigation after a complaint letter was received from a third-party.29 1
As a result, the company agreed to provide periodic updates on its
implementation of compliance measures for two years.292 The company
decided to arrange for all future travel through a single vendor to
ensure a better means of watching the payments and arrangements
being made.293
281.
282.
283.
284.
285.
286.
287.
288.
289.
290.
291.
292.
293.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id
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Goodyear Tire & Rubber

'

The SEC charged Goodyear Tire & Rubber Company
("Goodyear"), an Ohio-based company, with violating the FCPA for
transactions initiated by its subsidiaries to acquire sales in Africa.2 9 4
Goodyear agreed to pay more than $16 million to settle the U.S.
government's charges of accounting violations.2 95
According to the government's investigation, the company's
internal protocol failed to prevent or detect more than $3.1 million in
bribes during a four-year period due to an inadequate internal FCPA
compliance protocol.2 96 The improper payments were disguised as
legitimate expenses in the subsidiaries' books, which were then
"consolidated into Goodyear's books."297
The U.S. government's order found that the company violated the
books and records and internal control provisions of the FCPA. 298 The
settlement with the U.S. government included Goodyear's self-reporting
and prompt remedial acts, which includes the company creating new
positions to monitor compliance and other means of strengthening
internal protocols; its significant cooperation with the investigation was
considered.2 99 Goodyear must pay a little over $14.1 million, which
comprises the company's illicit profits in Kenya and Angola, plus
prejudgment interest of $2.1 million."* Goodyear also must report its
FCPA remediation efforts to the U.S. government for a three-year
period, which means showing what it is doing to stop the previous
payments and what protocols are being implemented to prevent future
issues from arising.30
This was not the first time Goodyear has violated the FCPA. In
1989, Goodyear plead guilty to charges of paying an advertising firm
bogus expenses that the company then conveyed to Iraqi government
officials in order to influence the Iraqi government to buy Goodyear
tires.302 One must wonder if the penalties being levied by the U.S.
government are enough to stop companies from violating the FCPA.

294.
(Feb. 24,
295.
296.
297.
298.
299.
300.
301.
302.
Criminal

Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., Exchange Act Release No. 74356, 110 S.E.C. Docket 19
2015).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Plea Agreement at 698.1601, 698.17 to .19, United States v. Goodyear Int'l Corp.,
No. 698.1601 (D.D.C. May 11, 1989).
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PBSJand WalidHatoum

The SEC charged Walid Hatoum, a former engineer and president
at PBSJ Corporation ("PBSJ"), a Florida-based company, with violating
the FCPA by offering and authorizing improper payments and
employment to foreign officials to secure government contracts in
Qatar.303 The U.S. government also announced a DPA304 with PBSJ that
defers FCPA charges "for a period of two years and requires the
company to comply with certain undertakings."3 05 As a part of this
agreement, the company had to pay a fine of $3.4 million.3 06
An investigation found that Hatoum offered to provide improper
payments to a local company owned and controlled by a foreign official
to secure multi-million Qatari government contracts for PBSJ.307 As a
result of the improper payments, the foreign official provided Hatoum
and PBSJ's international subsidiary "with access to confidential sealedbid and pricing information" that enabled the PBSJ subsidiary to tender
winning bids for a hotel resort development project in Morocco and a
light-rail transit project in Qatar.30 s The light-rail project alone was
worth $35.6 million dollars to PBSJ and the project in Morocco was
worth another $25 million.3 09 "Hatoum offered and authorized nearly
$1.4 million in bribes disguised as 'agency fees' intended for a foreign
official who used an alias to communicate confidential information that
assisted PBSJ."310 The company ignored its own internal protocols that
should have alerted it to the improper payments being made earlier.3 11
However, once the improper payments were discovered by the company,
it self-reported the FCPA violations and began to cooperate with
the government.3 12
As a result, the company agreed to pay approximately $3 million to
return the illegal profits, and an additional penalty of $375,000.3 3 The
penalty was small because PBSJ acted quickly to end the improper
303. Walid Hatoum, Exchange Act Release No. 74112, 110 S.E.C. Docket 14 (Jan. 22, 2015).
PBSJ is an acronym for Post, Buckley, Schub & Jernigan, Inc. See Terri L. Bryson, Recent
Developments, 33 STETSON L. REv. 667, 759 (2004).
304. Walid Hatoum, Exchange Act Release No. 74112, 110 S.E.C. Docket 14 (Jan. 22, 2015).
305. Press Release, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm'n, SEC Charges Former Executive at Tampa
Based Engineering Firm With FCPA Violations, (Jan. 22, 2015), https://www.sec.gov/news/
pressrelease/2016-34.html.
306. Id.
307. Id.
308. Id.
309. Id.
310. Id.
311. Id.
312. Id.
313. Id.
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relationship and "voluntarily made witnesses available for interviews
and provided factual chronologies, timelines, internal summaries, and
314
The
full forensic images to cooperate with the SEC's investigation."
government found that Hatoum "violated the anti-bribery, internal
accounting controls, books and records, and false records provisions" of
the FCPA.3 15 As a result, Hatoum paid a penalty of $50,000.316
VIII.

THE CHANGING WORLD

As can be seen from the cases discussed above, China has been
involved in many of the United States' FCPA actions. However, China
is changing. In 2014, China punished a total of 7826 individuals accused
of bribery, which was up 37.9% from 2013.3' In 2013, the Chinese
prosecuted 5515 individuals, which was an increase of 18.6%
from 2012.318 Thus, it is not just the United States involved in
preventing bribes.
In October 2015, Chinese anti-corruption investigators were
looking at deals by one of China's biggest energy companies in
Angola.3 19 The Chinese company allegedly overpaid for rights to tap
offshore oil fields. 3 20 As seen from the cases discussed above, this type
321
Other Chinese oil
of transaction is often indicative of bribes.
companies are under investigation for transactions from all over
the world.3 2 2
Russia, another jurisdiction implicated in many of the cases above,
began an investigation into Deutsche Bank for a possible moneylaundering scheme.323 This is a combined effort between the U.S., U.K.,
and Russia.3 24 They are investigating whether Germany's largest bank
properly vetted $6 billion in transactions that may have been involved in

314. Id.
315. Id.
316. Id.
317. Jainwei (Jerry) Fang, China Punished 7,826 Bribe Payors in 2014, and Other Facts You
Need to Know, FCPA BLOG (Aug. 10, 2015, 7:18 AM), http://www.fcpablog.com/blog/2015
/8/10/china-punished-7826-bribe-payers-in-2014-and-other-facts-you.html.
318. Id.
319. Brian Spegele, China Probes Oil Deals in Angola, WALL ST. J., Oct. 25, 2015, at AS.
320. Id.
321. See supra Parts VI-VII.
322. Spegele, supra note 319.
323. Gavin Finch & Ambereen Choudhury, Deutsche Bank Sets Aside $1.3 Billion, Mostly for
Russia Probe, BLOOMBERG (Oct. 29, 2015, 1:31 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/
2015-10-29/deutsche-bank-russian-equity-probe-unearths-policy-violations-.
324. Id.
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money laundering.3 25 This could result in one of the largest fines ever
imposed on a company.3 26
In Egypt, there is a website titled "I Paid a Bribe" which is aimed at
combatting the widespread corruption.3 27 This website allows people to
report when they had to pay a bribe and for how much.3 28 The ongoing
results will be relayed to the Egyptian government and hopefully punish
those that pay the bribes.329
IX.

CONCLUSION

So, what do all of these cases tell us? It is important to look at these
examples in whole to see where companies are failing under the FCPA.
The following table is a summation of the nine cases from 2015 and the
twenty-five cases from 2016.330 The SEC determinations of FCPA
violations break down as follows:

325. Id.
326.

See Mary Plunkett, Busted for Billions: 10 Biggest Corporate Fines Ever, THERICHEST

(Jan. 8, 2014), http://www.therichest.corn/rich-list/the-biggest/busted-10-biggest-corporate-finesever.
327.

Egyptians Expose Corruption by Reporting Bribery in Online Initiative, EGYPTIAN

STREETS (Oct. 29, 2015), http://egyptianstreets.com/2015/10/29/egyptians-expose-corruption-byreporting-bribery-in-online-initiative.

328. Id.
329. Id.
330. See infra Table 1.
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TABLE 1: FCPA ENFORCEMENT SUMMARY STATISTICS
Instances where the
company had no
internal FCPA
protocols in place,
or very minimal
protocols

4

In these cases, the U.S. government determined the
internal protocols were so minimal that their
existence was not effective.

Instances where the
U.S. government

14

In these cases, the company had a protocol in place
which was determined to be inadequate.

Instances where the
company/employees
ignored internal
protocols

18

In these cases, either the executives initiated the
behavior or condoned it.

Penalties when the

Total fines

20 parties

company did not

$1,500,677,955

found the FCPA
internal protocols to
be insufficient

331

Average fine

$75,033,898

self-report

Penalties when the

Total Fines

company self-

$59,982,000

332

12 parties

Average Fine

$4,998,500

reported

Instances when
employees
circumvented FCPA
protocols

20

Instances when a
subsidiary
circumvented FCPA
protocols

16

Instances when a
company was
required to report to
the SEC on
compliance efforts;
and the
corresponding term

16

Employees range from salespeople to executives.

2 cases

7 cases

7 cases

1-year
monitor

2-year
monitor

3-year
monitor

331. "Penalties" are the money above disgorgement and prejudgment interest that the company
agreed to pay either criminally or civilly. In two cases, the companies did not have to pay penalties
specifically because they self-reported. See supra Part VI.K, P. In one case where the company did
not self-report, it did not have to pay penalties because it could have made the business go under, so
it is excluded from the table above. See supra Part VI.N.

332. See supra Parts VI.F, J-K, P, VI.G, H-I.
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Upon examining the results of the 2015 and 2016 cases, key
takeaways begin to emerge. It is in the interest of the company to selfreport violations. Fines paid by companies were $71 million less on
average for those who self-reported FCPA violations. Every company
should take notice of this fact, if nothing else. The total fines for
companies that did not self-report was over $1.5 billion.
It is also startling that in 50% of all cases the company or its
employees ignored the existing FCPA protocols and still made illicit
payments. These were made at all levels of company employees, but
most were from executives or other high ranking employees at the
companies. In many of these cases, the American government required
the companies to hire independent monitors to ensure their compliance
with the FCPA. As you can see, this monitoring could extend to three
years. The vast majority of companies that self-reported did not have
this requirement.
It also was surprising that in over 10% of cases, the companies had
very minimal protocols in place. With the increased scrutiny from the
SEC and the DOJ in such matters, it is amazing that Fortune
500 companies are ignoring this requirement. Following the results
of these cases, those companies have had to implement
FCPA protocols.
Thus, the lessons to be learned from 2015 and 2016 are that
companies must have solid FCPA protocols in place and appoint
someone with the authority to enforce that protocol. This leads to the
next lesson learned, which is self-reporting. If the company has solid
FCPA protocols in place, and someone with the authority to report any
violation, it could save the company up to $71 million as we have seen
above. If a company does this, then it can prevent independent
monitoring of its business and save millions in the long-run.
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